We study online learning with the general notion of transductive regret, that is regret with modification rules applying to expert sequences (as opposed to single experts) that are representable by weighted finite-state transducers. We show how transductive regret generalizes existing notions of regret, including: (1) external regret; (2) internal regret; (3) swap regret; and (4) conditional swap regret. We present a general and efficient online learning algorithm for minimizing transductive regret. We further extend that to design efficient algorithms for the time-selection and sleeping expert settings. A by-product of our study is an algorithm for swap regret, which, under mild assumptions, is more efficient than existing ones, and a substantially more efficient algorithm for time selection swap regret.

In this paper, we develop efficient parameterized algorithms for regimes between these two extremes.

A recent line of work has established uncoupled learning dynamics such that, when employed by all players in a game, each player's regret after T repetitions grows polylogarithmically in T, an exponential improvement over the traditional guarantees within the no-regret framework. However, so far these results have only been limited to certain classes of games with structured strategy spaces--such as normal-form and extensive-form games. The question as to whether O(polylogT) regret bounds can be obtained for general convex and compact strategy sets--which occur in many fundamental models in economics and multiagent systems--while retaining efficient strategy updates is an importantquestion.

Scale-invariance in games has recently emerged as a widely valued desirable property. Yet, almost all fast convergence guarantees in learning in games require prior knowledge of the utility scale. To address this, we develop learning dynamics that achieve fast convergence while being both scale-free, requiring no prior information about utilities, and scale-invariant, remaining unchanged under positive rescaling of utilities. For two-player zero-sum games, we obtain scale-free and scale-invariant dynamics with external regret bounded by $\tilde{O}(A_{\mathrm{diff}})$, where $A_{\mathrm{diff}}$ is the payoff range, which implies an $\tilde{O}(A_{\mathrm{diff}} / T)$ convergence rate to Nash equilibrium after $T$ rounds. For multiplayer general-sum games with $n$ players and $m$ actions, we obtain scale-free and scale-invariant dynamics with swap regret bounded by $O(U_{\mathrm{max}} \log T)$, where $U_{\mathrm{max}}$ is the range of the utilities, ignoring the dependence on the number of players and actions. This yields an $O(U_{\mathrm{max}} \log T / T)$ convergence rate to correlated equilibrium. Our learning dynamics are based on optimistic follow-the-regularized-leader with an adaptive learning rate that incorporates the squared path length of the opponents' gradient vectors, together with a new stopping-time analysis that exploits negative terms in regret bounds without scale-dependent tuning. For general-sum games, scale-free learning is enabled also by a technique called doubling clipping, which clips observed gradients based on past observations.

Swap regret, a generic performance measure of online decision-making algorithms, plays an important role in the theory of repeated games, along with a closeconnection tocorrelated equilibria instrategicgames.

We give a randomized online algorithm that guarantees near-optimal $\widetilde O(\sqrt T)$ expected swap regret against any sequence of $T$ adaptively chosen Lipschitz convex losses on the unit interval. This improves the previous best bound of $\widetilde O(T^{2/3})$ and answers an open question of Fishelson et al. [2025b]. In addition, our algorithm is efficient: it runs in $\mathsf{poly}(T)$ time. A key technical idea we develop to obtain this result is to discretize the unit interval into bins at multiple scales of granularity and simultaneously use all scales to make randomized predictions, which we call multi-scale binning and may be of independent interest. A direct corollary of our result is an efficient online algorithm for minimizing the calibration error for general elicitable properties. This result does not require the Lipschitzness assumption of the identification function needed in prior work, making it applicable to median calibration, for which we achieve the first $\widetilde O(\sqrt T)$ calibration error guarantee.

Indeed, the no-regret framework addresses thefundamental question ofhowindependent anddecentralized agentscan"learn" with only limited feedback from their environment, and has led to celebrated connections with gametheoretic equilibrium concepts [Hart and Mas-Colell, 2000, Foster and Vohra, 1997].

This paper addresses the problem of designing efficient no-swap regret algorithms for combinatorial bandits, where the number of actions $N$ is exponentially large in the dimensionality of the problem. In this setting, designing efficient no-swap regret translates to sublinear -- in horizon $T$ -- swap regret with polylogarithmic dependence on $N$. In contrast to the weaker notion of external regret minimization - a problem which is fairly well understood in the literature - achieving no-swap regret with a polylogarithmic dependence on $N$ has remained elusive in combinatorial bandits. Our paper resolves this challenge, by introducing a no-swap-regret learning algorithm with regret that scales polylogarithmically in $N$ and is tight for the class of combinatorial bandits. To ground our results, we also demonstrate how to implement the proposed algorithm efficiently -- that is, with a per-iteration complexity that also scales polylogarithmically in $N$ -- across a wide range of well-studied applications.

Swap regret, a generic performance measure of online decision-making algorithms, plays an important role in the theory of repeated games, along with a close connection to correlated equilibria in strategic games. This paper shows an $\Omega( \sqrt{T N\log{N}})$-lower bound for swap regret, where $T$ and $N$ denote the numbers of time steps and available actions, respectively. Our lower bound is tight up to a constant, and resolves an open problem mentioned, e.g., in the book by Nisan et al. (2007). Besides, we present a computationally efficient reduction method that converts no-external-regret algorithms to no-swap-regret algorithms. This method can be applied not only to the full-information setting but also to the bandit setting and provides a better regret bound than previous results.